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SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
Ebon Brown brings this appeal following his 
conviction in the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Pennsylvania of unlawful possession 
of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 
He raises three arguments on appeal. First, he argues the 
District Court erroneously denied his motion to suppress 
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the firearm recovered by law enforcement. Second, he 
argues that the District Court erroneously admitted, under 
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), evidence that he had 
previously obtained guns through a straw purchaser. And 
third, he argues that a new trial is warranted because the 
District Court permitted the prosecutor to make improper 
statements during closing arguments.1 We are not 
persuaded by Brown’s argument that evidence of the 
firearm should have been suppressed. We agree, 
however, that the District Court erred in admitting 
evidence of Brown’s past firearm purchases and by 
overruling Brown’s objection to the prosecutor’s closing 
arguments. Because the Rule 404(b) error was not 
harmless, we will vacate the judgment of the District 
Court and remand for a new trial. 
I. 
 In the early morning hours of March 23, 2011, four 
Pittsburgh Police Detectives—Judd Emery, Mark 
Adametz, Calvin Kennedy, and Thomas Gault—were 
patrolling Pittsburgh’s Hill District in an unmarked 
                                                 
1  Brown also argues that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is 
unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause. Brown 
acknowledges that this argument is foreclosed by Third 
Circuit precedent, see United States v. Singletary, 268 F.3d 
196 (3d Cir. 2001) and United States v. Shambry, 392 F.3d 
631 (3d Cir. 2004), and thus raises it for preservation 
purposes only.  
 4 
 
police cruiser. As the detectives approached the 
intersection of Wylie Avenue and Duff Street, they 
observed a 2002 maroon Chevy Impala driven by Ebon 
Brown park near the intersection across the street from 
the Flamingo Bar, a nuisance bar where drug dealing and 
shootings regularly occur. All four detectives believed 
the Impala had been parked too close to the intersection 
in violation of 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3353. See App. 115, 
178, 191, 210.  
The detectives stopped their cruiser in the middle 
of the street and watched as Brown and three other 
passengers exited the Impala. As Brown was stepping 
out, he looked in the detectives’ direction and appeared 
to recognize their unmarked cruiser. Brown then sat back 
down in the Impala and made a motion which appeared 
consistent with removing an object from his waistband 
and placing it beneath the driver’s seat. Brown then 
stepped out of the vehicle, closed the door, and walked in 
the direction of the Flamingo Bar. All four detectives 
testified that, based on their experience, they believed 
Brown had removed a gun from his person and attempted 
to conceal it under the driver’s seat. See App. 117–22, 
169, 205, 221–22.  
The detectives exited the police cruiser and 
approached Brown and the other passengers. The 
detectives’ badges were visible and they identified 
themselves as Pittsburgh police officers. Detective Gault 
began speaking with Brown and informed him that the 
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Impala was parked in an illegal location. As this 
exchange was taking place, Detective Emery walked 
around to the passenger side of the Impala and shined his 
flashlight through the windshield. With the inside of the 
vehicle illuminated, Detective Emery observed “the grip 
and rear slide portion of a semi-automatic firearm 
sticking out from underneath the driver’s seat.” App. 172. 
Detective Emery immediately gestured to Detective 
Gault (by extending his thumb and index finger) that 
there was a gun in the vehicle. After seeing Detective 
Emery’s gesture, Detective Gault grabbed Brown to 
prevent him from fleeing. The detectives then asked 
Brown whether he had a permit to carry the firearm. 
When Brown answered that he did not, they placed him 
under arrest. 
Detective Emery retrieved the gun from the 
Impala, cleared a round from the chamber, and placed it 
in the trunk of the detectives’ cruiser. The detectives then 
performed pat-down searches of the other passengers, but 
found no weapons and did not place anyone else under 
arrest. At Brown’s request, the detectives gave the keys 
to the Impala to another passenger, James Cole. Cole 
moved the Impala to a legal parking space, and then he 
and the others proceeded to the Flamingo Bar.  
The Government charged Brown in a single-count 
indictment for being a felon in possession of a firearm in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Prior to trial, Brown 
filed a motion to suppress the evidence of the gun 
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retrieved from underneath the Impala’s seat. He argued 
that the police conducted an unlawful Terry2 stop and 
that they did not have a lawful basis to search the vehicle. 
The District Court denied the motion to suppress, app. 1–
20, and Brown proceeded to trial. 
Brown’s theory at trial was that the firearm 
belonged to his girlfriend, Brittney McCoy, and that she 
had left it beneath the seat of the Impala without his 
knowledge. McCoy testified for the defense and 
corroborated Brown’s story. McCoy explained that she 
had borrowed the Impala from its owner, Cassandra 
Whitaker, on the evening of March 22, 2011, because she 
needed it for an appointment the following morning.3 
App. 628–29. McCoy stated that immediately after 
borrowing the car, she removed the gun—which she had 
                                                 
2  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
3  Whitaker also testified for the defense and confirmed 
that she frequently loaned her car to family members and 
friends, including McCoy and Brown, and that she had loaned 
the Impala to McCoy on March 22, 2011. App. 581–82.   
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purchased for personal protection in August 20094—from 
her purse and placed it under the driver’s seat. She then 
drove the Impala to Brown’s house and parked it in the 
driveway directly behind Brown’s car. According to 
McCoy, later that evening while she and Brown were 
trying to sleep, her nephew called and asked Brown to 
give his girlfriend a ride somewhere. Brown agreed and 
left in the Impala (because it was blocking his car in), not 
knowing the gun was under the seat. App. 632. 
The Government maintained that Brown 
physically possessed the gun and placed it under the seat 
of the Impala after he spotted the police cruiser.  The 
Government also argued that even though McCoy 
purchased the gun, she had really purchased it for Brown. 
To establish this claim, the Government sought to 
introduce under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) 
                                                 
4  McCoy and Whitaker both testified regarding the 
events that prompted McCoy to purchase the gun. In August 
2009, four armed gunmen broke into Whitaker’s home 
looking for money to settle debts owed by McCoy’s brother, 
who also happened to be the father of Whitaker’s son. 
Whitaker stated that the attackers did not find money in the 
home, but stole her television, gun, clothing, jewelry, and car. 
They then tied her up and left the house. Whitaker eventually 
untied herself and called the police. She then called McCoy to 
let her know what had happened and to let her know to be 
careful. Fearing for her own safety, McCoy, accompanied by 
Whitaker, purchased the gun the following day. 
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statements that Brown made nearly seven years earlier in 
2005 admitting that he had used a straw purchaser to 
acquire firearms. In January 2005, Brown was arrested 
by Pittsburgh police for public urination. Pursuant to a 
lawful search of Brown’s vehicle in connection with his 
arrest, police officers recovered a handgun and more than 
250 stamp bags of heroin. After his arrest, Brown agreed 
to speak with agents of Pittsburgh’s Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATFE). Brown 
informed ATFE agents that he had repeatedly sold heroin 
to a “white male” who had agreed to buy firearms for 
Brown in exchange for the drugs. Brown claimed that the 
white male had purchased twelve guns on six different 
occasions, which Brown then sold to friends and 
relatives. Brown was later convicted of possession with 
the intent to distribute heroin and possession of a gun in 
furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. He was not 
charged with any crime related to the straw purchase 
transactions. 
In a pretrial motion, Brown sought to exclude the 
statement he had made to the ATFE agents about using a 
straw purchaser to obtain firearms. In response, the 
Government argued the statement was “relevant to show 
that [Brown] did have the knowledge that there was a 
firearm in his car and that he knows what firearms are.” 
App. 388. Further, the Government argued that these 
statements supported its theory that McCoy “straw 
purchased this firearm for [Brown].” App. 389. Brown 
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countered that the statement would be relevant only for 
propensity purposes, merely showing that if he had used 
straw purchasers before, then he must have used McCoy 
as a straw purchaser for this gun. He also argued that the 
Government did not have any evidence that McCoy was 
involved in the earlier straw purchases or that she 
purchased this firearm in concert with Brown. App. 388.  
After hearing from the parties, the District Court 
agreed with the Government and concluded that the 
evidence was relevant “to show motive or knowledge and 
that type of thing along those lines.” App. 390. However, 
the Court concluded the statements would be admissible 
only if McCoy took the stand and testified that she had 
purchased the firearm for personal purposes. App. 388, 
431–33, 650–52. The Court also limited the manner in 
which the evidence could be introduced, allowing the 
Government to introduce only a stipulation that Brown 
used straw purchasers to acquire guns. The parties agreed 
to the language of a stipulation, which was read to the 
jury at the close of evidence. The stipulation provided: 
“The defendant acknowledges using straw 
purchasers/third parties to purchase firearms for him in 
the past.” App. 683. Despite Brown’s agreement to the 
language of the stipulation, the Court noted his 
continuing objection to its admissibility under Rule 
404(b).  
During summation, defense counsel argued that 
there was a gap in the prosecution’s case because there 
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was no fingerprint evidence connecting Brown to the 
gun. Defense counsel stated that “none of us would have 
to be here today if there had been a fingerprint analysis 
because it would show what you already know, that Mr. 
Brown never possessed that gun or ammunition.” App. 
765. At the conclusion of defense counsel’s closing 
argument, the prosecution requested an instruction stating 
that the Government was not legally obligated to use any 
particular investigative technique. App. 779. The Court 
agreed and gave the following instruction: 
You have just heard argument by counsel 
that the government did not use specific 
investigative techniques, such as fingerprint 
analysis. You may consider these facts in 
deciding whether the government has met its 
burden of proof . . . . However, there is no 
legal requirement that the government use 
any specific investigative technique . . . . 
App. 784. 
The prosecutor then began his rebuttal by flipping 
defense counsel’s argument, stating that “[w]e haven’t 
heard any expert from the defense” regarding 
fingerprints. App. 785. Brown objected to this remark 
and argued that it impermissibly placed a burden on the 
defense. The Court sustained the objection and struck the 
comment. App. 786. The prosecutor then continued to 
address the lack of fingerprints. “I want to see if we can 
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talk about your own common sense in your daily 
experience about fingerprints,” he said. App. 786. The 
prosecutor explained that, in the heat of the moment, 
detectives do not have time to “get out . . . rubber gloves, 
to put this thing in a paper bag, and then go walk it over 
to the police vehicle and put it in a plastic evidence bag.” 
App. 787. He then followed this point with the following 
remarks, which are central to one of Brown’s arguments 
on appeal: 
You heard the officer, the first thing 
he did on this particular occasion was to take 
[the gun], he moved the slide back to take 
the one round that was in the chamber out of 
there . . . . And then he extracted the other 
rounds from the magazine . . . . He quickly 
put it back in the police car and in the 
process of doing that, he put his own 
fingerprints on what may have possibly 
existed there. We have no way of knowing 
whether there could be fingerprints on there, 
but I want to talk about your own common 
sense and your daily experiences. 
 Many of you probably have children. 
Your children probably touch your coffee 
table. Coffee table may have a glass top to 
it. When you see those marks that are on the 
coffee table from your children, do you see 
fingerprints of the type when the police 
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officers roll fingerprints or do you see 
smudges and smears, things that come into 
contact with that but could not be called 
fingerprints? They’re smudges and smears. 
Even on a nice, clean, smooth surface like a 
piece of glass that is on your coffee table 
you find only smears and smudges, you do 
not find fingerprints.  
App. 787–88. 
 At this point, defense counsel objected and argued 
the prosecution was testifying about facts that were not in 
evidence. App. 788 (“You don’t see fingerprints on glass 
surfaces. We didn’t hear testimony about that.”). Defense 
counsel argued that “the [prosecutor’s] statement fairly 
implied, if not explicitly stated, that a fingerprint could 
only smudge or smear glass, not put fingerprints on it, 
which is — he could suggest that is common sense, that 
that’s a fact, but it’s not — we didn’t hear testimony on 
that, so we need a qualifier.” App. 789. The District 
Court overruled the objection and allowed the prosecutor 
to continue making the argument “as long as [he] 
direct[ed] [his statements] to common sense and [not the 
jurors’] everyday lives.” App. 789.  
After the objection was overruled, the prosecutor 
continued arguing that the jurors’ common sense should 
inform them that smudges and smears on a glass table 
“are not the type of fingerprints that one would roll from 
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a police thing.” App. 790. He then extrapolated this point 
to the firearm recovered by law enforcement, arguing that 
the jurors’ common sense should inform them that a gun 
with a “microtextured surface” is equally unlikely to hold 
fingerprints. App. 790. (rhetorically asking the jurors: “Is 
it likely that you’re going to find fingerprints on [a 
firearm with a microtextured surface], from your own 
experience, from your common sense . . . ?”). 
 The jury returned a verdict convicting Brown of 
the single § 922(g)(1) offense charged. The District Court 
subsequently sentenced Brown to a 92-month term of 
imprisonment. This timely appeal followed.5  
II. 
Brown raises three arguments on appeal. First, he 
contends the District Court erroneously denied his 
motion to suppress the firearm. Second, he argues the 
stipulation about his prior use of a straw purchaser was 
improperly admitted. And third, he argues that a new trial 
is warranted because the prosecutor made improper 
statements during his closing argument that 
fundamentally affected the fairness of the trial. We 
address these arguments seriatim.  
A. 
                                                 
5  The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 
3231, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C § 1291. 
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 The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable 
searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Brown 
contends that both his seizure by police and the seizure of 
the firearm and ammunition from the Impala were 
violative of his Fourth Amendment rights. We disagree. 
Police encounters with citizens fall into one of 
three broad categories, each with varying degrees of 
constitutional scrutiny: “(1) police-citizen exchanges 
involving no coercion or detention; (2) brief seizures or 
investigatory detentions; and (3) full-scale arrests.” 
United States v. Perez, 443 F.3d 772, 777 (11th Cir. 
2006). The first type of encounter does not implicate the 
Fourth Amendment. United States v. Williams, 413 F.3d 
347, 352 (3d Cir. 2005) (stating that officers do not 
violate the Fourth Amendment “merely by approaching 
individuals on the street or in other public places”); see 
also Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991). The 
second category (i.e., brief seizures or Terry stops) 
requires a showing that the officer acted with reasonable 
suspicion. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000) 
(stating that an officer may “conduct a brief, 
investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, 
articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot”) 
(citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)). And the 
third category (i.e., full-scale arrests) is proper only when 
an officer has probable cause. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 
91 (1964) (“Whether [an] arrest was constitutionally 
valid depends . . . upon whether, at the moment the arrest 
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was made, the officers had probable cause to make it.”). 
Here, the detectives’ brief interaction with Brown 
touched on all three but was valid under each. 
The initial step in our suppression analysis is to 
determine whether a seizure has taken place and, if so, 
when the seizure occurred. United States v. Torres, 534 
F.3d 207, 210 (3d Cir. 2008); Johnson v. Campbell, 332 
F.3d 199, 205 (3d Cir. 2003) (stating that in conducting a 
suppression analysis, the court “must first determine at 
what moment [the defendant] was seized”). As already 
noted, a Fourth Amendment seizure “does not occur 
simply because a police officer approaches an individual 
and asks a few questions.” Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434. 
Rather, “[a] seizure occurs only ‘when [a police officer], 
by means of physical force or show of authority, has in 
some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.’” United 
States v. Crandell, 554 F.3d 79, 84 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19–20 n.16).  
We apply an objective test when evaluating 
whether an officer’s “show of authority” would have led 
a reasonable person to believe they were not free to 
leave. Crandell, 554 F.3d at 84 (stating that the test is 
whether a reasonable person in light of all the 
circumstances would have perceived the officer’s actions 
as restrictive). The Supreme Court has articulated several 
factors to be considered as part of this objective inquiry, 
including, inter alia, “the threatening presence of several 
officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some 
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physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use 
of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance 
with the officer’s request might be compelled.” United 
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554–55 (1980); see 
also United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 204 (2002).  
 Considering these factors, we agree with the 
learned District Judge that no seizure occurred prior to 
the moment Detective Gault physically grabbed Brown to 
prevent him from fleeing the scene. There was nothing 
about the detectives’ brief initial approach that 
constituted a Fourth Amendment seizure. The evidence at 
the suppression hearing shows that the detectives did not 
activate their lights or sirens, brandish their weapons, 
block Brown’s path, physically touch Brown, or make 
any threats or intimidating movements. Instead, the 
detectives merely exited their cruiser and approached 
Brown in a public space to discuss their concerns about 
where the Impala was parked.  
 Brown argues that the detectives demonstrated 
their authority by approaching in a group of four, 
displaying their badges, and identifying themselves as 
Pittsburgh police officers. These facts are not enough to 
tilt the balance in Brown’s favor. A Fourth Amendment 
seizure does not occur merely because police officers 
identify themselves when engaging a citizen in 
conversation. And although the detectives approached in 
a group, as the District Court found, “there was ‘no 
threatening presence,’ since the number of detectives 
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evenly matched the number of individuals who had 
exited the Impala.” App. 11 (citing Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 
at 554). We agree with the District Court that the totality 
of the circumstances suggests that the detectives’ 
approach and initial contact with Brown was a mere 
encounter that did not implicate the Fourth Amendment.6 
 Although the detectives’ initial interaction with 
Brown did not implicate the Fourth Amendment, the 
encounter ripened into a Terry stop at the moment 
Detective Gault grabbed Brown’s waistband to prevent 
him from fleeing. Although this conduct constituted a 
Fourth Amendment seizure, it is well-established that 
officers do not need to obtain a warrant to “conduct a 
brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a 
reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is 
                                                 
6  Brown also argues that the detectives made a “show of 
authority” by taking action that was “more aggressive than 
necessary.” Appellant’s Br. at 28. More specifically, he 
argues that if the detectives “were concerned about the safety 
of the Impala’s position, they should have rolled down their 
windows and asked that it be moved” rather than approaching 
on foot. This argument misses the point. The question is not 
what course of conduct the detectives “should” have pursued, 
but whether their actions were constitutionally permissible. 
As already explained, the brief initial encounter did not 
constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure. The simple fact that 
the detectives could have taken another course of action does 
not render their conduct unconstitutional. 
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afoot.” Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. 
at 30).  
Reasonable suspicion is “a less demanding 
standard than probable cause and requires a showing 
considerably less than preponderance of the evidence.” 
Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123 (citing United States v. 
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)). The officer must simply 
have some objective justification for the stop and must be 
able to articulate more than an “unparticularized 
suspicion or ‘hunch’” that the suspect is engaged in 
criminal activity. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 (citing Terry, 
392 U.S. at 27). When making reasonable suspicion 
determinations, reviewing courts “must look at the 
‘totality of the circumstances’ of each case to see whether 
the detaining officer has a ‘particularized and objective 
basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” United States v. 
Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (quoting United States 
v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)). “This process 
allows officers to draw on their own experience and 
specialized training to make inferences from and 
deductions about the cumulative information available to 
them that ‘might well elude an untrained person.’” Id. 
(quoting Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418). We “give considerable 
deference to police officers’ determinations of reasonable 
suspicion.” United States v. Mosley, 454 F.3d 249, 252 
(3d Cir. 2006) 
We agree with the District Court that Detective 
Gault’s brief seizure of Brown was supported by 
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reasonable suspicion. Detective Gault grabbed Brown 
after Detective Emery had legally observed the firearm 
under the Impala’s driver’s seat and communicated his 
discovery by making a hand gesture. Although there may 
be some circumstances where simple knowledge of a 
firearm does not provide reasonable suspicion for a Terry 
stop, see United States v. Ubiles, 224 F.3d 213, 218 (3d 
Cir. 2000), here the observation of the firearm is 
considered in conjunction with the fact that the officers 
witnessed Brown make furtive movements consistent 
with an attempt to conceal the weapon and the fact that 
the encounter occurred in a “high crime area.” Wardlow, 
528 U.S. at 124; see id. (“[O]fficers are not required to 
ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in 
determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently 
suspicious to warrant further investigation.”); United 
States v. Valentine, 232 F.3d 350, 356 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(noting the fact that the stop occurred in a “high crime 
area” among the relevant contextual considerations in a 
Terry analysis). Viewing these circumstances as a whole, 
we find that the brief detention of Brown was justified by 
reasonable suspicion.  
We also find no constitutional infirmity with 
Brown’s subsequent custodial arrest. Immediately after 
seizing Brown, the detectives inquired whether he had a 
permit to carry the firearm. When Brown answered that 
he did not, the officers placed him under arrest. Brown’s 
admission that he lacked a permit to carry the firearm 
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provided probable cause to support his arrest. 
The detectives also did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment when they recovered the gun from the 
Impala. Officers may conduct a warrantless search of a 
vehicle incident to arrest in two instances: “(1) if the 
arrestee is within reaching distances of the vehicle during 
the search, or (2) if the police have reason to believe that 
the vehicle contains ‘evidence relevant to the crime of 
arrest.’” Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2425 
(2011) (quoting Arizona v. Gant, 332 U.S. 332, 344 
(2009)). This case fits squarely within the second 
exception because unlawful firearm possession was the 
crime for which Brown was arrested. 
 For these reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s denial of Brown’s motion to suppress the 
firearm.  
B. 
 Brown next challenges the District Court’s 
decision to allow the Government to introduce evidence 
that he had previously used a straw purchaser to obtain 
firearms. We hold that the admission of this evidence 
was improper. 
 Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), which governs 
the admissibility of a defendant’s prior bad acts, provides 
that “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not 
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admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show 
that on a particular occasion the person acted in 
accordance with the character.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). 
The rule states, however, that “[t]his evidence may be 
admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Fed. R. 
Evid. 404(b)(2).  
We have explained that Rule 404(b) is generally a 
rule of exclusion. United States v. Caldwell, — F.3d —, 
2014 WL 3674684, at *5 (3d Cir. July 24, 2014). It 
“directs that evidence of prior bad acts be excluded—
unless the proponent can demonstrate that the evidence is 
admissible for a non propensity purpose.” Id.  Our 
opinions have repeatedly and consistently emphasized 
that the party seeking to admit evidence under Rule 
404(b)(2) bears the burden of demonstrating its 
applicability. Id. at *6. 
 There are four distinct steps that must be satisfied 
before prior bad act evidence may be introduced at trial: 
(1) it must be offered for a proper non-propensity 
purpose that is at issue in the case; (2) it must be relevant 
to that purpose; (3) its probative value must not be 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice under Rule 
403; and (4) it must be accompanied by a limiting 
instruction, if one is requested. Caldwell, 2014 WL 
3674684, at *7 (citing United States v. Davis, 726 F.3d 
434, 441 (3d Cir. 2013)). This methodical process 
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requires “careful precision” by both the proponent in 
proffering the prior act evidence and by the trial judge 
who must decide the question of admissibility. Id. at *4. 
 At trial, the Government argued that Brown’s 2005 
statement to ATFE agents that he had used a straw 
purchaser to obtain firearms was “relevant to show that 
he did have the knowledge that there was a firearm in his 
car and that he knows what firearms are.” App. 388. 
Applying the framework described above, we must first 
determine whether the identified non-propensity purpose 
(here, “knowledge”) is at issue in the case, and then 
evaluate whether the evidence is relevant to that purpose.  
When evaluating whether a non-propensity 
purpose is at issue, we “consider the ‘material issues and 
facts the government must prove to obtain a conviction.’” 
Caldwell, 2014 WL 3674684, at *6 (quoting United 
States v. Sampson, 980 F.2d 883, 888 (3d Cir. 1992)). In 
other words, the government cannot offer Rule 404(b) 
evidence for a non-propensity purpose if doing so would 
not materially advance the prosecution’s case. Here, 
Brown was charged with unlawful possession of a 
firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), 
which requires proof that: “(1) the defendant has been 
convicted of a crime of imprisonment for a term in 
excess of one year; (2) the defendant knowingly 
possessed the firearm; and (3) the firearm traveled in 
interstate commerce.” United States v. Huet, 665 F.3d 
588, 596 (3d Cir. 2012). Thus, the Government may 
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introduce Rule 404(b) evidence only if it is offered for a 
non-propensity purpose that is probative of one of the 
elements essential for a conviction. 
We reject out of hand the Government’s argument 
that the evidence was admissible to show that Brown 
“knows what firearms are.” App. 388. It is conceivable 
that a defendant might challenge a § 922(g)(1) charge by 
claiming he does not know what a firearm is.7 In the 
ordinary course, however, a defendant’s general 
knowledge about firearms is not in question in a felon-in-
possession case, and the government is thus not required 
to show that the defendant “knows what firearms are” to 
secure a conviction. To be sure, Brown did not claim he 
was unfamiliar with firearms. Absent such a claim or 
suggestion by a defendant, a rule permitting the 
introduction of Rule 404(b) evidence for the purpose of 
showing the defendant “knows what firearms are” would 
have the effect of rendering all prior bad acts related to 
                                                 
7  Unlike a drug case, where the unfamiliar nature of the 
substance may allow a defendant to claim he mistook the substance 
for something else or otherwise did not know he possessed drugs, 
see, e.g., United States v. Long, 225 F.3d 656 (4th Cir. 2000) (per 
curiam) (defendant claiming he did not know the substance at issue 
was cocaine, but believed it to be a hormone stimulant to help 
chickens become better fighters), it is difficult to imagine a 
scenario where a defendant could contend he did not know the 
object in his possession was a firearm. Indeed, we have been 




firearms admissible in a felon-in-possession trial. Such a 
result could not have been the intent of the drafters of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence.  
We thus turn to whether the evidence was 
admissible to show Brown “had knowledge there was a 
firearm in his car.” App. 388. We have recently 
explained that a defendant’s knowledge is rarely at issue 
in a weapons-possession case when the prosecution relies 
exclusively on a theory of actual possession. Caldwell, 
2014 WL 3674684, at *8. This is because, “absent 
unusual circumstances . . . , the knowledge element in a 
felon-in-possession case will necessarily be satisfied if 
the jury finds the defendant physically possessed the 
firearm.” Id. In contrast, however, “[e]vidence of 
knowledge . . . is critical in constructive possession cases, 
as ‘[a] defendant will often deny any knowledge of a 
thing found in an area that is placed under his control 
(e.g., a residence, an automobile) or claim that it was 
placed there by accident or mistake.’” United States v. 
Williams, 620 F.3d 483, 489 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting 
United States v. Jones, 484 F.3d 783, 788 (5th Cir. 
2007)). This case presents the “paradigmatic constructive 
possession scenario,” United States v. Garner, 396 F.3d 
438, 443 (D.C. Cir. 2005), where a firearm is found in 
proximity to a defendant who claims he did not know it 
was there. Accordingly, we have no difficulty concluding 
that showing Brown’s knowledge that the gun was in the 
Impala was an appropriate non-propensity purpose for 
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offering the evidence of Brown’s previous straw 
purchases. 
 Yet it is not enough for the Government to merely 
identify a valid non-propensity purpose under Rule 
404(b)(2). Crucially, the Government must also show 
that the evidence is relevant to that purpose. To do so, the 
prosecution “must clearly articulate how that evidence 
fits into a chain of logical inferences, no link of which 
can be the inference that because the defendant 
committed [the proffered prior offense], he therefore is 
more likely to have committed [the charged offense].” 
Sampson, 980 F.2d at 887. This is where the 
Government’s proffer falls short. The Government has 
completely failed to explain how the fact that Brown 
used a straw man in 2005 to purchase firearms tends to 
prove that he knowingly possessed the gun under the 
driver’s seat of the Impala six years later. These are two 
entirely distinct acts, and participation in one has no 
relationship to the other. See Davis, 726 F.3d at 443 
(holding that defendant’s prior conviction for cocaine 
possession not admissible to show knowledge in a trial 
for cocaine distribution because “[p]ossession and 
distribution are different in ways that matter”); cf. 
Caldwell, 2014 WL 3674684, at *12 (“If the prior 
possession was of a different gun, then its value as direct 
or circumstantial evidence of the charged possession 
drops and the likelihood that it is being used to show 
propensity to possess guns rises considerably. Similarly, 
 26 
 
as the prior possession is further removed in time, it 
becomes less probative of possession on the date 
charged.”) (citation omitted). 
The Government’s primary argument, which was 
accepted by the District Court, is that the straw purchaser 
evidence refutes McCoy’s testimony that she purchased 
the gun for her own personal protection. According to the 
Government, the fact that Brown used a straw purchaser 
in the past makes it more likely that he used McCoy as a 
straw purchaser to obtain the gun recovered by the 
detectives.  Extrapolating from this proposition, the 
Government argues then that it is likely that Brown knew 
about the gun in Whitaker’s Impala. There are multiple 
problems with this line of reasoning. 
First, the fact that Brown used a straw purchaser to 
obtain firearms in 2005 does not discredit McCoy’s 
testimony that she purchased the gun for personal 
protection in August 2009. The circumstances 
surrounding Brown’s use of a straw purchaser were 
unique to him—he was selling heroin to an unnamed 
individual who agreed to purchase firearms in exchange 
for drugs. There is no parallel between that scenario and 
McCoy’s purchase of the firearm in August 2009, one 
day after four armed men assaulted her friend in an 
attempt to collect debts owed by her brother. The 
Government did not present evidence disputing the 
sequence of events surrounding McCoy’s purchase of the 
firearm. An even more conspicuous omission was its 
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failure to present evidence that McCoy had previously 
participated in a straw purchase with Brown (or anyone 
else for that matter). And significantly, this all occurred 
while Brown was still serving a prison sentence for his 
2005 conviction. It is simply too great a leap in logic to 
suggest that because Brown once used a straw purchaser 
in a quid pro quo drug transaction, he must also have 
used McCoy as a straw purchaser for the gun recovered 
in Whitaker’s Impala. And it is an even greater leap to 
then conclude that such a strained inference somehow 
made it more likely than not that Brown constructively 
possessed the firearm.  
All of this aside, there is an even more 
fundamental problem with the Government’s proffer 
under Rule 404(b). Quite simply, the Government’s chain 
of inferences is indubitably forged with an impermissible 
propensity link. The first logical step in the 
Government’s analysis requires the jury to conclude that 
because Brown used a straw purchaser in the past, he 
must therefore have used a straw purchaser here. This is 
propensity evidence, plain and simple.  Davis, 726 F.3d 
at 442 (“[T]he government must explain how [the 
evidence] fits into a chain of inferences—a chain that 
connects the evidence to a proper purpose, no link of 
which is a forbidden propensity inference.”). 
Our concern that the evidence went only to show 
Brown’s propensity to commit gun crimes is not 
alleviated by the District Court’s explanation for why the 
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evidence was admitted. As we have explained, “[t]he 
district court, if it admits the evidence, must in the first 
instance, rather than the appellate court in retrospect, 
articulate reasons why the evidence also goes to show 
something other than character.” Sampson, 980 F.2d at 
888; see also Caldwell, 2014 WL 3674684, at *7 (“[O]ur 
decisions are . . . emphatic in requiring the proponent and 
the trial judge to articulate, with precision, a chain of 
inferences that does not contain a propensity link.”) 
(emphasis added). After hearing from the parties, the 
Court concluded that the prosecution could “use this 
[evidence] to show motive or knowledge and that type of 
thing along those lines.” App. 390 (emphasis added). 
This statement does not reflect the type of “careful 
precision” our precedent demands. Caldwell, 2014 WL 
3674684, at *4. It supplies the defendant with little notice 
of the non-propensity purpose for which the evidence 
against him is being admitted, and it says nothing of how 
the evidence is probative of that purpose. Of course, “a 
mere recitation of the purposes in Rule 404(b)(2) is 
insufficient.” Davis, 726 F.3d at 442; see also 
Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal 
Evidence § 4:28, at 730 (“[I]t is lamentably common to 
see recitations of laundry lists of permissive uses, with 
little analysis or attention to the particulars.”). 
When confronted with a proffer under Rule 404(b), 
a district court should not merely inquire of the 
prosecution what it wishes the evidence to prove. Rather, 
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the court should also require the prosecution “to explain 
‘exactly how the proffered evidence should work in the 
mind of a juror to establish the fact the government 
claims to be trying to prove.’” Caldwell, 2014 WL 
3674684, at *12 (quoting United States v. Miller, 673 
F.3d 688, 699 (7th Cir. 2012)) (emphasis added). In our 
case, that means the District Court should have asked the 
Government to answer this question: “How, exactly, does 
Brown’s admission to ATFE agents that he sold heroin in 
exchange for firearms in 2005 suggest that he had 
knowledge of the gun found under the driver’s seat of the 
Impala on the morning of March, 23, 2011?” Put to this 
task, the Government would have been unable to 
articulate the requisite chain of inferences without resort 
to propensity-based links or attempts to build a bridge too 
far.8  
                                                 
8  The Government has modified and expanded its 
position on appeal.  It now argues that the evidence of past 
straw purchases is relevant to show not only that Brown knew 
the gun was in the Impala, but also that he “knew how to 
obtain a gun through the use of a straw purchaser, had the 
intent to possess the firearm, and his possession was not 
unknowing, accidental or mistaken.” Gov’t Br. at 41. Setting 
aside that these arguments were not advanced in its proffer 
before the District Court, the Government has still not shown 
that these are proper grounds for admission. The material 
issue in the case was whether Brown knew the gun was under 
the driver’s seat of the Impala, not whether he knew how to 
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For these reasons, we conclude that the evidence 
that Brown used a straw purchaser to obtain firearms in 
the past was admitted in error. Nevertheless, the 
Government maintains that, even if erroneous, the 
admission of evidence regarding Brown’s past use of a 
straw purchaser was harmless. “The test for harmless 
error is whether it is ‘highly probable that the error did 
not contribute to the judgment.’” United States v. 
Cunningham, 694 F.3d 372, 391–92 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(citation omitted). We will find such a high probability 
only when we have a “sure conviction” that the error did 
not unfairly prejudice the defendant. Id. at 392. 
The Government contends the error was harmless 
because the evidence of Brown’s past involvement with a 
straw purchaser was introduced only by way of a brief 
stipulation that did not discuss the specific details of the 
prior act. We are not persuaded by this argument. 
Whether offered in a brief stipulation or a simple “yes” 
or “no” question on cross-examination, the prejudicial 
impact of prior bad act evidence is significant. As the 
Supreme Court has explained, when—as here—proffered 
prior bad act evidence serves only to show the 
                                                                                                             
obtain firearms through straw purchasers. And for the same 
reasons set forth above, it is too great a leap to suggest that 
the fact that Brown used a straw purchaser to obtain guns 
seven years ago tends to prove his intent to possess the gun 




defendant’s propensity to act unlawfully, “it is said to 
weigh too much with the jury and to so overpersuade 
them as to prejudge one with a bad general record and 
deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a particular 
charge.” Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 476 
(1948)). See also Fed. R. Evid. 404(a) Advisory 
Committee’s Note (“Character evidence is of slight 
probative value and may be very prejudicial. It tends to 
distract the trier of fact from the main question of what 
actually happened on the particular occasion. It subtly 
permits the trier of fact to reward the good man and to 
punish the bad man because of their respective characters 
despite what the evidence in the case shows actually 
happened.”). In this case, the stipulation suggested to the 
jury that Brown was a bad actor with a history of gun 
crimes. This necessarily impugns his character and tends 
to impermissibly sway the balance in the Government’s 
favor. To hold the error harmless merely because the 
evidence was offered by way of stipulation would create 
a blueprint for introducing improper Rule 404(b) 
evidence in a manner insulated from the consequences of 
appellate review. We decline to endorse such a rule. 
The Government also argues the error was 
harmless because the remainder of the Government’s 
evidence that Brown knowingly possessed the gun was 
“overwhelming.” Gov’t Br. at 51. There is no doubt that 
the Government presented a substantial case against 
Brown, including offering consistent testimony from all 
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four detectives that he made furtive movements 
consistent with concealing a firearm under the driver’s 
seat of the Impala. At the same time, however, the 
Government failed to present anyone who could put the 
firearm in Brown’s hands. And Brown introduced his 
own witness, McCoy, who testified that she placed the 
gun under the seat without Brown’s knowledge. In the 
end, it may well be that the jury would have convicted 
Brown with or without the straw purchaser stipulation. 
Nonetheless, there is not enough on this record for us to 
possess a “sure conviction” that this is so. We therefore 
must conclude the error was not harmless.  
C. 
Because we conclude that the erroneous admission 
of Rule 404(b) evidence was not harmless error, we are 
not required to address Brown’s final contention that the 
District Court erred by not sustaining his objection 
during the prosecutor’s rebuttal summation. However, in 
the interest of providing guidance to the District Court on 
remand, we will briefly explain why the prosecutor’s 
remarks during rebuttal were improper.  
Brown argues that the prosecutor improperly 
testified about facts not in evidence when he suggested 
(1) that Brown’s fingerprints were covered up by the 
detective who retrieved the gun from the Impala, and (2) 
that fingerprints could not be recovered from smooth 
surfaces like a glass table or the exterior of a gun. We 
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agree with Brown’s argument. 
Improper statements made during summation may 
warrant a new trial when such statements “cause[] the 
defendant substantial prejudice by so infecting the trial 
with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a 
denial of due process.” United States v. Shareef, 190 F.3d 
71, 78 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted). Our first task is to determine whether 
the prosecutor’s comments were improper. United States 
v. Mastrangelo, 172 F.3d 288, 297 (3d Cir. 1999). “If we 
conclude that a comment was improper, we must apply a 
harmless error analysis, looking to see if ‘it is highly 
probable that the error did not contribute to the 
judgment.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Zehrbach, 47 
F.3d 1252, 1265 (3d Cir. 1995) (en banc)). 
During closing arguments, a criminal defendant 
“certainly is entitled to direct the jury’s attention to what 
he believes are loopholes in the government’s case and to 
argue that these loopholes establish the non-existence of 
facts which the government would have proven if it had 
the evidence.” United States v. Rubinson, 543 F.2d 951, 
965–66 (2d Cir. 1976). Rebuttal summation provides the 
Government an opportunity to respond to those 
arguments. “As a general rule, Government counsel 
should not be allowed to develop new arguments on 
rebuttal, but should be restricted to answering the 
arguments put forth by defense counsel.” United States v. 
Taylor, 728 F.2d 930, 936 (7th Cir. 1984) (citations 
 34 
 
omitted). “While the prosecution in rebuttal may explain 
why it has not proven certain facts or respond to the 
interpretation which the defense has placed on its failure 
to present evidence, it may not use the defense’s 
comments to justify the reference to facts or the assertion 
of claims which it could have, but did not, introduce at 
trial.” Rubinson, 543 F.2d at 966; see also United States 
v. Gray, 876 F.2d 1411, 1417 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[I]t is 
improper to base closing arguments upon evidence not in 
the record.”); Charles Alan Wright et. al, Federal 
Practice and Procedure § 588 (4th ed. 2011) (“It is 
misconduct for a prosecutor to make an assertion to the 
jury of a fact, either by way of argument or by an 
assumption in a question, unless there is evidence of that 
fact.”).  
We conclude that the prosecutor’s argument that 
fingerprints could not have been extracted from the 
firearm inappropriately relied on facts not in evidence. 
During his closing, defense counsel questioned the 
Government’s proof by pointing out the lack of forensic 
fingerprint evidence. It would have been permissible for 
the prosecution to respond to this argument by noting the 
general challenges police officers face in trying to 
preserve forensic evidence in the rapidly-unfolding 
events surrounding an arrest. It was not appropriate, 
however, to suggest or speculate that the particular 
firearm at issue was incapable of retaining identifiable 
fingerprints—at least not without evidence to substantiate 
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that claim. The Government could have presented expert 
testimony to explain that the surface of the firearm at 
issue would not hold fingerprints, or that the detectives 
covered up any identifiable prints when they removed the 
gun from the Impala. Failing to do so, however, the 
Government was not permitted to make this argument 
during its rebuttal summation.  In short, the prosecutor 
was testifying. 
The Government contends that the prosecutor was 
merely asking the jurors to use their own common sense 
and attempting to draw upon their “ordinary experiences 
concerning when fingerprint evidence would be 
recoverable.” Gov’t Br. at 58. We seriously doubt that 
jurors possess a common understanding of the 
circumstances under which investigators can extract 
fingerprints from a weapon, a glass table, or any other 
surface. A juror may have observed a smudge on her 
coffee table, but that does not translate into an 
understanding of when such a smudge can be extracted 
by law enforcement as an identifiable fingerprint.9 Nor 
does it provide the juror with a “common sense” 
understanding about whether the “microtextured surface” 
of a firearm will hold fingerprints. App. 790.  
To be sure, the Government was not legally 
                                                 
9  Indeed, the District Court even challenged the 
prosecutor’s suggestion, stating “You can get fingerprints off 
glass, if it’s done right.” App. 789. 
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obligated to conduct a fingerprint analysis of the firearm 
in the Impala. Nor was it required to offer a forensic 
expert at trial in order to carry its burden of proof. 
Indeed, at the Government’s request, the jury was 
instructed that “there is no legal requirement that the 
government use any specific investigative technique” in 
order to establish Brown’s culpability. App. 784. Yet by 
electing not to present such evidence explaining its 
inability to obtain fingerprints from the firearm, the 
Government could hardly then argue that issue to the 
jury. We conclude the prosecutor’s remarks were 
improper.10 
III. 
For the reasons set forth above, we will vacate the 
judgment of the District Court and will remand for a new 
trial. 
 
                                                 
10  In the ordinary course, we would now turn to consider 
under a harmless error analysis whether the improper 
comments were so prejudicial that a new trial is warranted. 
See Mastrangelo, 172 F.3d at 297 (“If we conclude that a 
comment was improper, we must apply a harmless error 
analysis . . . .”). However, such analysis is not necessary 
because we have already concluded Brown’s conviction must 
be vacated on other grounds. 
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SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting 
in part. 
 
 I agree with my colleagues that the District Court 
properly denied the motion to suppress and that the 
Government’s comments in its rebuttal summation 
concerning fingerprint evidence were improper.  We part 
company, however, because even if the evidence of Brown’s 
use of straw purchasers was improperly admitted,1 I would 
nonetheless conclude that the error was harmless.  Thus, I 
respectfully concur in part and dissent in part. 
                                              
 1 Because I believe that any error in admitting the prior 
bad act evidence was harmless, I would not reach the closer 
question of whether admission of the evidence violates Fed. 
R. Evid. 404(b).  I note, however, that Rule 404(b)(2) does 
not bar all evidence that could also lead to an inference of 
propensity.  If it did, then the cautionary instruction that trial 
courts must deliver upon request under Huddleston v. United 
States, 485 U.S. 681, 691-92 (1988), to ensure that that the 
evidence is not used for an improper propensity purpose 
would be unnecessary.  In this case, even though the evidence 
could demonstrate a propensity for using others to buy guns 
for Brown, I believe the evidence had a proper purpose under 
Rule 404(b)(2)—namely, to refute Brown’s defense that his 
girlfriend purchased the gun for herself and that he did not 
know she left it in the car, and thereby show Brown knew of 
the gun’s presence in the car and that it was not there by 
mistake.  Cf. United States v. Moorehead, 57 F.3d 875, 878 
(9th Cir. 1995) (permissible admitting testimony that a 
witness observed the defendant with the same gun in the past 
to rebut a defense witness’s claim that she placed the gun 
under the seat). 
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 This Court has held that “[w]here evidence is 
improperly admitted, reversal is not required where it is 
highly probable that the error did not contribute to the 
judgment.”  United States v. Berrios, 676 F.3d 118, 131 (3d 
Cir. 2012) (quotation marks omitted); United States v. 
Cunningham, 694 F.3d 372, 392 (3d Cir. 2012) (an error is 
deemed harmless unless the Court has a “sure conviction that 
the error did not prejudice the defendant” (quotation marks 
omitted)).  When measured against the evidence presented, I 
would conclude that it is highly probable that any error did 
not contribute to the judgment. 
 
 First, four detectives testified that they saw Brown in 
his car, reach in the area of his waistband, and then move in a 
way consistent with reaching under his seat.  Second, the gun 
was found partly tucked under that seat.  While the gun may 
not have been seen in Brown’s hand, Maj. Op. at 29, it was 
precisely where the detectives saw him reach.  Third, the gun 
was visible to those outside of the car and hence was very 
likely visible to one seated inside it.  Fourth, the prior bad act 
evidence, which involved conduct different from the conduct 
charged, was admitted in a short statement and offered in a 
very sanitized way.2  The jury was not exposed to any of the 
details that the Majority describes regarding Brown’s 
statement to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and 
Explosives about his arrangement to use one of his drug 
                                              
 2 I agree with my colleagues that packaging evidence 
in a stipulation does not immunize it from the careful 
weighing that we require under Fed. R. Evid. 403, but we 
should nonetheless examine how the evidence was presented, 
used, and compared with the other evidence offered when 
conducting a harmless error analysis.    
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customers to buy him guns in exchange for drugs.  Rather, the 
jury was told only that “the defendant acknowledges using 
straw purchasers/third parties to purchase firearms for him in 
the past.”  App. 683.  Fifth, the limited evidence that the jury 
heard was presented only because of, and to refute, Brown’s 
defense3 and it was not harped on, as it was mentioned only 
once during  closing argument.  Cf. United States v. Smith 
725 F.3d 340, 344 (3d Cir. 2013) (noting that the Government 
repeatedly referred to the defendant’s prior bad acts in 
summation). Thus, the evidence in this constructive 
possession case was strong and it is highly probable that the 
single reference to Brown’s prior use of others to purchase 
firearms for him did not contribute to the judgment.  As the 
prior bad act evidence did not prejudice Brown, the admission 
of the evidence was harmless and I would therefore affirm the 
judgment.4 
 
 Accordingly, I respectfully concur in part and dissent 
in part. 
                                              
 3 Furthermore, the prior use of straw purchasers was 
not the Government’s only method of impeaching Brown’s 
girlfriend.  On cross-examination, the Government elicited 
that she had not been truthful about her employment on her 
gun permit, she was not familiar with guns, and she had told 
Brown’s probation officer she did not own a gun.  
 4 The Government’s improper comments during 
summation do not change the result, in light of the strong 
evidence of Brown’s guilt and the District Court’s nearly 
contemporaneous instruction that the summations were 
merely argument that the jury could not treat as evidence.  
